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Looking for the Big Picture -
Developing a Jurisprudence for a
Biotechnological Age
Joan M. Ferretti*
I. Purpose
Biotechnology is rapidly emerging and becoming a part of
our daily life.1 Investment decisions are made everyday while
legal commentators comment, criticize, and propose new legis-
lative and regulatory responses to govern the biotechnology
arena.2 This article posits for biotechnology: (a) that in terms
of the regulatory and legal system's responsibility to society,
* Joan M. Ferretti is a partner in the law firm of Lustberg & Ferretti, Glens
Falls and Long Lake, New York, an Adjunct Professor at Pace University School of
Law and a member of the State of New York and the Washington D.C. Bars. She
received her J.D. from Temple University School of Law, her M.A. in Biology from
the University of Pennsylvania and her B.S. in Biology from Fordham University.
Her law practice focuses on federal and state aspects of environmental law and litiga-
tion. She also teaches Conservation Law at Pace University School of Law. Previously
she worked for the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United
States Endangered Species Scientific Authority.
1. See, e.g., Biosurface Technology - Fledgling Company, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1,
1993, at 40; Anita M. Samuels, The Grower of Grease-Eating Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1992, at 8F.
2. See, e.g., the existing regulations are summarized and suggestions made in,
Linda Maher, Environmental Concerns: The Domestic Regulatory Framework for
Biotechnology, 12, no. 4 NYSBA ENvTL. L. SEC. J. 16 (Nov. 1992); Peter Mostow,
Reassessing the Scope of Federal Biotechnology Oversight, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
227 (1992); Lawrence Fisher, The Fragile, Beleaguered Biotechs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1993, at D1, D17.
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valuable lessons can be learned from our experience with or-
ganic chemical technology from the 1940s up to the present;
(b) that it would be a mistake to embark on a regulatory pro-
gram for biotechnology without establishing, in a forward-
looking way, the appropriate relationship between regulations
and the common law; and, (c) where appropriate, statutes
should be enacted that specify rights, remedies, and applica-
ble evidentiary standards. This article does not present a leg-
islative proposal. Instead, it sets out a series of questions that
must be addressed to develop a jurisprudence for the bi-
otechnological era.
II. The Historical Perspective of 50 Years of Organic
Chemical Technology
A. The Introduction of Organic Chemical Technology to
Post-War American Society
During World War II, the need for rubber substitutes,
pharmaceuticals, and materials for aviation provided an in-
centive for basic organic chemical research. After the war,
war-time technologies were converted for peace-time uses and,
almost overnight, organic chemicals became part and parcel of
everyday life. Various synthetic fabrics, wrappings and pack-
agings for industrial, commercial and household use followed
rapidly. Organic chemicals became standard worldwide as ag-
ricultural pesticides and fertilizers. Synthetic fuel additives,
pesticides for household, commercial and medical uses, plas-
tics, synthetic pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics became com-
mon place. Paints, inks, solvents, greasers and de-greasers, ad-
hesives, floorings, and sidings can be and are derived from
organic chemicals. Almost overnight, whole industries be-
came dependent upon organic chemicals.3 Previously non-ex-
istent industries became significant market players 4 due to lu-
3. See, e.g., Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Amendments to 6 N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Part 326 Relating to the Restriction of the Pesticides Al-
drin, Chlordane, Chloropyrifos, Dieldrin and Heptachlor, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Con-
servation, at 308-14 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter Draft EIS].
4. Analysis of the Risks and Benefits of Seven Chemicals Used for Subterra-
nean Termite Control, United States Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA-540/9-83-005
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crative sales of these new commercial products. Organic
chemicals and their products promised to enhance the Ameri-
can Dream.
Meanwhile, the nation was engaged in large scale post-
war growth, development, and euphoria. Highways were built,
and whole new communities emerged, as Levittowns (housing
developments) began to surround many major metropolitan
centers. Suburbs expanded and began to crowd out farm
lands, making increased farm production a necessity. Gas ra-
tioning ceased and Americans demanded more automobiles.
Home improvements, lawn care, furnishings and trappings, ig-
nored and threadbare through years of war and depression,
suddenly took on new life. Consumer demand increased. Men
resumed their places in the work force, while "Rosie-the-
Riveter" went back into the home and the baby boom genera-
tion was born.5 At this time, the nation's focus was on growth
and development, not on the potential for environmental
harm or the health consequences which could result from the
wide-scale use of organic chemicals. In fact, such concerns did
not come into national focus until nearly thirty years later.
B. Why Organic Chemical Technology is an Appropriate
Model for Biotechnology
The science of organic chemical production is essentially
simple. It is the science of carbon rings or chains, which, by
the addition or subtraction of hydrogen, oxygen, halogens or
phosphates through mixing or distilling, produces products as
diverse as pesticides and plastic wraps, but also produces
wastes even more diverse than the products.6 Despite the
(Nov. 1983); Draft Technical Support Document for Chlordane, Heptachlor, Aldrin
and Dieldrin, United States Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA-OPP 1-12, 111-2 to 111-5
(July 1987) [hereinafter Technical Support Document]; J. Everett Bussart & A.
Schor, Chlordane, SOAP AND SANITARY CHEMICALS, Aug. 1948, at 16 (authors are em-
ployees of Velsicol Chem. Corp).
5. See ALISTAIR COOKE'S AMERICA 373-75 (Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y. 1974).
6. See generally MORRISON & BOYD, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY (Allyn & Bacon, Inc. ed.
1966); Farm Chemicals Handbook, 1984; THE MERCK INDEX: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CHEMICALS AND DRUGS (8th ed. Merck & Co., Inc. 1968); Recognition and Manage-
ment of Pesticide Poisonings, United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Pes-
19931
3
714 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
simplicity of the production methods, organic chemical tech-
nology has created several complicated problems which have
continually challenged regulators, courts, and communities.
These can be summarized as follows:
(a) The formulation processes are imprecise, yielding
mixtures with varying chemical percentages in different
batches. 7
(b) The industry was capable of making and selling prod-
ucts long before it could even identify the compounds in
the mixtures and by-products, and long before it could
adequately test and assess their individual toxicities and
the potential adverse effects on the environment and
people.8
(c) Manufacture and marketing of organic chemicals pre-
dated society's ability to accurately measure residues in
the environment or living tissue."
(d) Evaluation of the health or environmental effects of
exposure to organic chemicals is complicated by the simi-
larity of responses between and among exposure to dif-
ferent chemicals, metabolic changes, and the latency pe-
ticide Programs, EPA-540/9-77-013, (2d ed. Aug. 1977). See also Technical Support
Document, supra note 4, at A-1, A-6; Draft EIS, supra note 3, at 15; Carcinogenicity
Assessment of Chlordane and Heptachlor/Heptachlor Epoxide, United States Envtl.
Protection Agency, Carcinogen Assessment Group, Office of Health and Environmen-
tal Assessment, OHEA-C-204, Dec. 1986 at 3-1 thru 3-3 [hereinafter CAG Report].
7. See CAG Report, supra note 6, at 3-1 to 3-4; Plaintiff's Exhibit # 7, at A-796
to A-835, Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau
County, Sept. 5, 1991) (Standard for Technical Chlordane (Aug. 1971)); Plaintiff's
Exhibit # 8, at A-761 to A-795, Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, Sept. 5, 1991) (Standard for Technical Chlordane
July 1979)); see also Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133, Record on Ap-
peal 754-59, 486-93 (pending N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't).
8. Tomoyuki Miyazaki et al., Isolation and Structure Elucidation of Some Com-
ponents in Technical Grade Chlordane, 14 ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. CONTAMINATION &
TOXICOLOGY 475 (1985); William P. Cochrane & Roy Greenhalgh, Chemical Composi-
tion of Technical Chlordane, 59 J. OF THE AOAC,696 (1976); Dearth & Hites, Com-
plete Analysis of Technical Chlordane Using Negative Ionization Mass Spectrome-
try, 25 ENVIRON. Sci. TE cHNOL. 245-54 (1991); see also Jones, No. 92-02133, Record on
Appeal 754-59, 486-93, 503-05.
9. See generally supra note 8; Draft EIS, supra note 3; C. G. Wright & R. B.
Leidy, Chlordane and Heptachlor in the Ambient Air of Houses Treated for Ter-
mites, 28 BULL. ENVIRON. CONTAM. TOXICOL. 617-23 (1982).
. [Vol. 10
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riods which accompany the development of many
chemically-induced diseases.10
The science of biotechnology is multi-dimensional and
more complex than the science of organic chemical technol-
ogy. Its processes include work and manipulation at the tis-
sue, cellular, ultra-cellular, (i.e., the organs of the cell) and bi-
ochemical (as distinguished from organic chemical) levels.11
Its products include genetically-altered viruses and bacteria,
which could potentially perform a whole host of environmen-
tally, commercially or agriculturally valuable services, cul-
tured or genetically altered cells which could be implanted in
plants, animals or humans, for a variety of medical or com-
mercial purposes, and much more. 12 Its waste stream poten-
tially includes not only the solvents, nutrients and culture me-
dia involved in the process, but also off-spec, unsatisfactory
living materials, and spent or used living material."3 Despite
its heightened scientific complexity, biotechnology will also be
complicated by the difficulties of identification, detection, and
latency of manifestation, which complicate evaluations in or-
ganic chemical technology. To this level of unpredictability,
biotechnology adds the potential for regeneration, recombina-
tion and mutation in uncontrolled or loosed cells or orga-
10. See CAG Report, supra note 6, at 3-4 to 3-8; E. P. Savage et al., National
Study of Chlorinated Hydrocarbon Insecticide Residues in Human Milk, USA, 113
AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 413 (1981); See also Technical Support Document, supra
note 4, at 11-1-169; CAG Report, supra note 6, at 4-32 to 4-62, 4-63 to 4-81, 6-1 to 6-7;
see also Jones, No. 92-02133, Record on Appeal 532-34.
11. J.N. DAVIDSON, THE BIOCHEMISTRY OF NUCLEIC ACIDS (Academic Press 1972);
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: 5 PATENTING LIFE - SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-370, at 93-102 (Washington,
D.C., U.S. Printing Office, Apr. 1989); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1 OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337, at 5-6 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Printing Office,
Mar. 1977); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 4 U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, OTA-BA-360, at 3 (Wash-
ington, D.C., U.S. Printing Office, July 1988).
12. See supra note 1. See, e.g., Geoffrey Cowley, Progress on Parkinson's, NEWS-
WEEK, Dec. 7, 1992 at 68; Soil Decontamination of Heavy Metals, undated, with per-
mission of Summit Environmental Evaluations, Inc.; Sharon Begley et al., Cures from
the Womb, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1993, at 49-51; see also It's a (Blonde-Haired, Blue-
Eyed, Even-Tempered, Ivy-Bound) Boy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 7, 1993, § 6, at 20.
13. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 1, at 8F; see also Shanks, infra note 114.
1993]
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nisms, and the same phenomena in their hosts or targets. 14
Like the situation at the end of World War II, the nation
is now on the brink of a new technological era, with a develop-
ing technology which has a similar potential for becoming
commonplace, beneficial, profitable, and problematic. The sci-
ence of biotechnology is more complex than the science of or-
ganic chemical technology because it has the potential to alter
living processes, re-program DNA molecules, select for altered
cells or genes, predict biological events, splice living tissues
into different organisms, farm and harvest bacteria and vi-
ruses, and effect genetic engineering. 15 However, similar to or-
ganic chemical technology, biotechnology is unpredictable,
risky, and capable of causing pollution and harm to health
and the environment. Also, like organic chemical technology,
biotechnology offers benefits to society and huge profits to in-
vestors. The countervailing pressures are, therefore, virtually
identical. For these reasons, our societal-legal experience with
organic chemical technology is an appropriate model for eval-
uation of legislative responses to biotechnology.
C. Overview of Backward-Looking Regulatory Responses to
Organic Chemical Technology
At the outset, organic chemical technology was devoid, for
all practical purposes, of regulatory limitations. From the
1940s until the mid-1960s, the nation was seemingly oblivious
to its developing legacy of abandoned hazardous waste dumps,
fields and by-ways wasted by excessive pesticides, fish and
wildlife threatened by pesticides and fertilizers, and of a pop-
ulation exposed to unquantified, unevaluated, unstudied, and
unexplained risks of harm." In the heat of the World War II
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOP-
MENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 3 FIELD TESTING ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: GENETIC AND
ECOLOGICAL IssuEs, OTA-BA-350, at 11-18, 71-108 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Printing
Office, May 1988).
15. E.g., supra notes 1, 12.
16. See, e.g., RACHAEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING - 25TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION,
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1962; see generally Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act .(CERCLA) §§ 103-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 1002-11012, 42
[Vol. 10
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effort, a regulatory approach to organic chemicals was not a
priority. Even after the war, it was still not a consideration.
The price the nation has incurred for its lack of organic
chemical foresight is now being paid by Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties (PRPs)17 at waste sites across the nation. This has
resulted in a diversion of resources away from investment and
economic growth. The nation's health care system, its taxpay-
ers, its natural resources, and its citizen's health, enjoyment
and prosperity have also paid the price for the lack of organic
chemical foresight.
This lack of foresight is illustrated by the fact that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
not created as the lead federal environmental agency until
1970.18 Moreover, until 1972, there were no real federal regu-
latory programs that addressed organic chemicals. In 1972,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) was enacted.19 The Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) were not enacted until 197620 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) was not enacted until 1980.1 The predecessor
U.S.C. §§ 6701-6999k (1988). This is further supported by the legislative history of
CERCLA and RCRA. See generally 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-6240; 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6252 and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576-5702.
17. "PRPs" or Potentially Responsible Parties are those parties who, generally
without conceding liability, are participating in the clean-up of waste sites on the
National Priority List. CERCLA §§ 105, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605, 9607 (1988); see 40
C.F.R. § 300.425 (1992) (National Priority List requirements) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 300
(1992) (National Contingency Plan).
18. President Nixon's Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 40 C.F.R. 1.1 (1970), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 99 (1989 Supp.) and 84 Stat. 2086 (1970); see also SHELDON
NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 2.01, 15.01 (1987 & 1992).
19. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (current version codified as
amended at Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) §§ 2-31, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)).
20. See Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (current version codified as
amended at Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 2-311, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988));
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (current version codified as amended at
RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6999k (1988)).
21. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (current version codified as amended
at CERCLA §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
1993] 717.
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statutes were administered on a fragmented basis and were
largely unenforceable. Furthermore, the implementing regula-
tions for RCRA and TSCA did not take effect until 1980,22
nearly forty years after the first synthetic derivatives of or-
ganic chemicals were manufactured and the first organo-chlo-
rinated pesticides were applied to fields in the United
States.2 Moreover, in 1991, the Clean Air Act (CAA) regula-
tions for toxic air pollutants were still under development.2 '
The direct regulatory approaches to organic chemicals
have included: registration of pesticides (1972),25 bans on
toxic substances (1976),26 regulation of the generation, trans-
portation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste
(1976),27 and establishment of a revolving fund for cleaning up
past and inactive hazardous waste sites (1980).28 Incidental
regulations impose specific requirements for work places, in-
terstate carriers, food and drug additives, air emissions, efflu-
ent discharges, and oil spills. 29
Each statute was enacted as a fire-fighting device after
22. Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066-36,588 (May 19, 1980).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Edward F. Premo, II, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990:
Hazardous Air Pollutants Controls and New Permit Program, 11, no. 2 NYSBA
ENVTL. L. SEC. J. 3-7 (Aug. 1991); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (toxic water pollutants - PCB's).
25. FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1 3 6 y (1988).
26. TSCA §§ 2-311, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
27. RCRA §§ 3001-3021, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1988).
28. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
29. FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6999k (1988);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) §§ 311, 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1342
(1988) (oil spills and effluent discharges respectively); Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-
618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988), CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp II.
1990) (Toxic Air Emissions); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) §§ 2-311, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988); see also Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
(HMTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988); Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) §§ 1401-1465, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (1988) (also referred to as the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA)); and The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) §§ 2-
205, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988) (also commonly referred to as The Ocean Dump-
ing Act). See generally SHELDON NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1992);
DONALD W. STEVER, THE LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
(1992).
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the legacy of waste sites and water pollution was unearthed,"
after the annual commerce in toxic or hazardous substances
was documented,31 after industry standards and practices had
evolved independently, 2 after exposure of the entire popula-
tion to certain pesticides was documented,33 and after it was
belatedly recognized that exposure of organisms and the envi-
ronment to organic chemicals was dangerous and unhealthy.
Consequently, the approach has been reactive at best. The re-
sponse so far has been to clean up abandoned waste sites, im-
pose a manifest system and treatment, storage and disposal
standards on an industry already in place, require "registra-
tion" of pesticides already in use, and to create and imple-
ment a permit program for discharges of pollutants into water
and emissions of air pollutants into the atmosphere from in-
dustrial processes long in use. These were all reactive mea-
sures caused by a lack of foresight and were not "forward
looking." '34 Little reflection was given to the burdens of estab-
lishing the efficacy and safety of processes or products, en-
forcement, or public and private redress. Consequently, as ex-
plained below in Part I.D., courts are split over the extent to
which individuals and communities may recover for risks and
damages caused by organic chemical technology. 35 Society has
30. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE, EPA-SW-826 (1980);
AMENDING THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT, S. REP. No. 161, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(May 15, 1979).
31. TSCA § 2(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a), (b) (1988).
32. See supra notes 16, 30.
33. See Savage et al., supra note 10; CAG Report, supra note 6, at 3-6; Draft
EIS, supra note 3, at xiv; Registrations of Pesticides Containing Heptachlor or Chlor-
dane - Intent to Suspend - Findings of Imminent Hazard, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,456,
34,457-34,459 (Aug. 15, 1975); August Curley, et al., Chlorinated Hydrocarbon Insec-
ticides in Organs of Stillborn and Blood of Newborn Babies, 19 ARCH. ENVIRON.
HEALTH, 628-32 (1969); Z.W. Polishuk et al., Organochlorine Compounds in Mother
and Fetus During Labor, 13 ENVTL. RESEARCH 278-84 (1977); Walter Melvin, Jr.,
Chlordane: Review of the Literature, USAF, (Oct. 1974) (military housing); Chlor-
dane in Military Housing, Subcomm. on Chlordane in Military Housing, Comm. on
Toxicology, Nat'l Research Council, Nat'l Academy of Sciences, (Wash. D.C. Aug.
1979) (military housing). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Shell Chem. Co. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
34. See supra notes 16, 30.
35. See infra part II.D.
19931
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never really come to grips with the concepts of risk and un-
foreseeability, which are now known to be inherent in organic
chemical technology. 6 As a result, only one organic chemical
was ever banned under TSCA.-7 Under FIFRA, numerous pes-
ticides whose components were known and/or unknown have
been registered for wide-scale use, despite the fact that on its
face FIFRA incorporates a rebuttable presumption against re-
gistration of pesticides.38 Even as the nation is grappling with
the efficacy of garbage incinerators as a waste disposal tool,
the CAA's toxic air pollutant standard-setting requirements
remain largely unimplemented. 9 With the exception of the
Clean Water Act's (CWA) construction grants, the "technol-
ogy forcing" elements of the CWA and the CAA, and some
"innovative enforcement" in the 1970's, there has not been
any truly affirmative approach to organic chemical technology.
There are no permitted treatment, storage and disposal
(TSD) facilities on industrial Long Island, even though the
application process has been in place for thirteen years."0 Be-
cause each of these devices, although prospective in applica-
tion, are backward-looking in development and implementa-
tion (i.e., designed to redress an existing problem), they were,
therefore, limited in technological scope, unable to project or
allow for what might have been, unable to maximize produc-
tivity, and have typically been opposed by unforewarned in-
vestors and others who have funded them.41
36. See supra part II.B.; see, e.g., Ellen Silbergeld, The Uses and Abuses of Sci-
entific Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 2 ABA NAT. RESOURCES & THE ENV'T 17-20,
57-59 (Fall 1986).
37. TSCA § 6(e)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A) (1988). See generally SHELDON
NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 15.05(4) (polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB's)) and § 15.08, pages 15-26, 27, 40, 41 (EPA has also instituted a production
phase down for chlorofluorocarbon propellants) (1992).
38. FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
39. See Premo, supra note 24, at 3.
40. Verified Petition, Request for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 11, para. 39, Chemical Pollution Control, Inc. v. New York State
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Index No. 92-13109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk County,
May 22, 1992) (Article 78 proceeding pending).
41. See, e.g., the protracted litigation of State of New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1985). Although the matter was settled in 1992, the
settlement of the litigation was preceded by years of costly litigation, in which basic
[Vol. 10
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D. Overview of Backward-Looking Judicial Responses to the
Impacts of Organic Chemical Technology
The legislative and subsequent regulatory responses to
organic chemical technology did not take place until the mid-
1970s, thirty years after the first wide-scale uses of organic
chemicals.42 The courts were then called upon for many years
to adjudicate rights and liabilities and to fashion remedies in
individual cases, with limited guidance from the "official" law
and policy makers, the state legislatures and the Congress.
When it finally arrived, most environmental legislation
specifically declined to address private rights or remedies, and
instead reserved such remedies as may have been available in
state courts under state common law.43 Thus, while many fed-
eral environmental statutes created private rights of action to
enforce the law, remedies were typically limited to injunctive
relief and to civil penalties which went directly to the United
States Treasury."4 Injured plaintiffs were left to traditional
state common law remedies for the collection of damages or
other personal relief, and the courts were not afforded any
guidance on when or to what extent the increasingly pervasive
regulatory requirements or standards should be invoked on
behalf of private litigants. Congress has almost uniformly de-
clined to articulate whether violation of federal environmental
laws constitutes an act actionable by private parties in tort.
Today's common law is complicated by the existence of
legal questions were exhaustively litigated, hundreds of parties were impleaded, and
the site went unremediated. Relatively speaking, this was a minor site.
42. See supra notes 16, 30.
43. See, e.g., FWPCA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988); SDWA § 1449(e), 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8(e) (1988); RCRA § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988); CAA 304(e),
42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also FIFRA § 16, 7 U.S.C. § 136n
(1988), OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(f)(1), 660(a) (1988); CERCLA §§ 107(f), 113(g), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9613(g) (1988); TSCA § 20(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3) (1988);
MPRSA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1416 (1988). CERCLA's provision for payment of dam-
ages to states for resource damages falls short of providing a personal remedy for
injury to person or damage to property. See also infra note 44.
44. CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988); TSCA § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619
(1988); FWPCA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); MPRSA § 105(g), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g) (1988); SWDA § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (1988); CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp II. 1990).
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statutory and regulatory laws that address the same subject
matters (e.g., pesticides, hazardous waste leachate). However,
because Congress has provided no guidance as to the appro-
priate relationships between common law jurisprudence and
the standards, requirements and burdens established by stat-
ute and regulation, de facto social policy decisions have been
and are being made by the courts. Courts, however, are ill-
equipped to create a jurisprudence embodying social value
considerations which, in a democracy, are primarily the prov-
ince of the legislature. Legislation is supposed to represent
collective wisdom, borne of the full and public explication of
the many facets of an issue. Judges, in contrast, are intention-
ally isolated and constrained in their ability to consider and
review controversies placed before them. It is axiomatic that
good judges search for the narrowest basis for a ruling, avoid-
ing any issue which is not essential to a holding. Further, de-
velopment of a jurisprudence by the courts in a new area of
the law is, of necessity, a painfully slow process. Litigants do
not always appeal erroneous rulings to the highest level
courts, and when they do, appellate courts in search of the
"narrowest" basis for a ruling, often side-step the seminal is-
sue or provide unclear guidance to lower courts through split
opinions.45
When the courts were called upon to adjudicate with re-
spect to the impacts of organic chemical technology, this re-
sult was exacerbated. The attendant scientific issues are very
complex and not easy for lay jurists and jurors to readily un-
derstand. The scientific uncertainties inherent in the technol-
ogy and the fact that our knowledge of these uncertainties de-
veloped after the initial investment decisions were made, has
made courts reluctant to ascribe financial liability to parties
in the absence of legislative directive, even though they may
have profited handsomely from organic chemical technology.46
Because regulatory requirements are variable and standards
for ascribing fault and assessing evidence in administrative
45. The costs of prosecuting appeals in civil toxic tort actions with lengthy trial
records often prove prohibitive to private plaintiffs. See infra note 50.
46. See infra notes 68-69.
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proceedings differ from those in civil suits, courts are reluc-
tant to ascribe civil liability based on regulatory standards ab-
sent an expressed legislative directive. As a result, courts tend
to bar plaintiffs from relying on such standards for fear of
confusing the jury.4 7 Conversely, precisely because the actual
science is too complex for ready understanding by lay jurists
and jurors, government "findings" of safety or standards are
readily translated into findings of no negligence or no harm
when proffered as a shield by defendants. This result occurs
even when the findings are out-dated or contradicted by con-
flicting scientific data proffered at trial."' Taken together, the
inherent characteristics of organic chemical technology and
the regulatory response to it have yielded some paradoxical
results in the contexts of common law liability, damages, and
the applicable evidentiary principles.
1. Liability
When called upon to adjudicate private claims arising
from exposure to organic chemicals in the environment, the
home, the workplace or in products (e.g., cigarettes, cosmetics,
fruits and vegetables), state court judges and federal judges,
applying state substantive law, have been called upon to make
certain threshold decisions regarding the potential liability of
defendants. First, courts must decide whether Congress has
enacted any pervasive statutory law that manifests an intent
to pre-empt the common law claims of negligence, products
liability, and failure to warn. Second, a court must determine
if any statutory requirements or governmental standards de-
fine, modify, or have any relationship to the common law ele-
ments of reasonableness, foreseeability and duty. Finally, a
court must determine to what extent the elements of foresee-
ability and reasonableness can be given meaning when applied
to a technology whose very processes have rendered, at rele-
vant points in time, the specific biological end point or out-
come unknown.
47. See infra notes 72, 93, 97.
48. See infra notes 86, 97, 117.
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a. Pre-emption
Ironically, even though Congress declined to pre-empt the
authority of state common law for private redress, some
courts have held that federal statutory law pre-empts common
law damage actions sounding in theories of negligence, defec-
tive product, and failure to warn. 9
Simple questions, like whether government approval of a
label precludes a common law action for failure to warn, have
received different answers in different courts, have travelled
up to and down from the Supreme Court, and have nearly
bankrupted many plaintiffs and their attorneys in the pro-
cess.50 Other troubling questions are whether government ap-
proval of a process, procedure or product precludes a common
law action for a defective product or ultra hazardous activity,
or even, taken to the extreme, whether the absence of a pro-
hibitory statute or standard, when theoretically one could
have been enacted, precludes a finding of unreasonableness. 1
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (cigarettes); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931
(Nev. 1992) (FIFRA implicitly pre-empts state tort claims based on failure to ade-
quately label pesticides); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (finding that FIFRA's labelling requirements pre-empt failure-to-warn
actions premised on state law); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.
Fla. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(FIFRA's labelling requirements pre-empt failure-to-warn actions based on state law,
but FIFRA's registration and safety requirements do not pre-empt actions based on a
"defective product" theory); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir.
1987) (because cigarette warnings are written by the federal government, failure-to-
warn action premised on state law is pre-empted).
50. E.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987). Plaintiffs may recover for injuries from cigarette smoking on a theory of neg-
ligent failure to warn when the warning label was approved by the U.S. Government,
only upon a showing that the defendant willfully concealed facts which should have
been disclosed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. After more than
twelve years of litigation, plaintiffs and their attorneys voluntarily discontinued the
case citing financial inability to proceed.
51. See generally SHELDON NOVICK, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
§§ 13.01(6), 13-16 thru 13-18; Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 424-25 (5th
Cir. 1989) (federal labelling did not pre-empt plaintiff's state law claims based on
inadequacy of pre-1966 warnings on "defective product" theory); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (pesticides);
Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (pesticides). See also
Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (D. Conn. 1986); Billsborrow v. Dow,
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These defenses are routinely interposed with varying success
in private litigation throughout the country.
Although governmental approval of a product or its label
or compliance with regulation is not generally deemed conclu-
sive on the questions of product fitness, failure to warn or
negligence,52 the fact that the government has approved la-
bels, products or methodologies has frequently been asserted
as a defense in actions for damages premised on theories of
strict products liability, failure to warn, breach of implied
warranty of fitness, negligence, trespass or nuisance. Plaintiffs
typically counter with the following: (a) government rules and
standards expressly establish minimum standards for both
safety and labelling requirements; (b) Congress did not intend
to pre-empt private remedies at common law; (c) state courts
are free to impose more stringent rules for the protection of
their citizens through the tort law system; and (d) most de-
fendants could have warned and restricted, or limited or dis-
continued the product's use, without incurring multiple incon-
sistent burdens.5
527 N.Y.S.2d 352, 357, 139 Misc. 2d 488, 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1992); Samuels v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1012, 130 Misc. 2d. 175, 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985); see supra notes 49-50. The converse question is whether plaintiffs may intro-
duce subsequent deregistration or banning of a product or process as proof or evi-
dence of defect or hazard. See Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., Index no. 18111/84
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, Sept. 5, 1991). See also Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d
261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 461 N.E.2d 864 (1984) and progeny.
52. See, e.g., Jackson v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 400 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 407 A.2d 1204 (N.J. 1979) (compliance with [OHSA]
regulations would not preclude a finding of negligence if there is competent proof
that a reasonable manufacturer would have taken additional precautions).
53. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984). See generally Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (FIFRA); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (FIFRA); New York State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1989) (FIFRA); EPA General Counsel opinion, No. 74-6 (May 13, 1979); Wells v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir. 1986) (lack of warning on
spermicide may be sufficient for the purpose of meeting federal regulatory standards,
but not for state tort law purposes); Macgillivray v. Lederle Labs, 667 F. Supp. 743,
746 (D.N.M. 1987) (warnings approved by Federal Food and Drug Administration
establish minimum standards); compare International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481 (1987). E.g., Merrell v. Thomas, 608 F. Supp. 644 (D. Or. 1985), afl'd, 807
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 615 U.S. 848 (1987) (FIFRA exists for the
protection of man and his environment); Continental Chemists Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
1993]
15
726 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,5" the Supreme Court
articulated a two-part test for determining whether a federal
statute pre-empted state common law claims for personal in-
jury. First, "[i]f Congress evidences an intent to occupy a
given field, any state law falling within that field is pre-
empted."5 5 Alternatively,
[i]f Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted
to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is,
when it is impossible to comply with both state and fed-
eral law. . . or where the-state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress. 6
In its analysis, the Silkwood court determined the pre-
emptive posture of the Atomic Energy Act. In Ferebee v.
Chevron Chemical Co.,57 the D.C. Circuit Court examined the
pre-emptive power of FIFRA, the law regulating all organic
pesticides. The Ferebee court examined the text and legisla-
tive history of the relevant FIFRA provisions, and concluded
that Congress did not intend to pre-empt the regulation of
pesticides or their labeling. The Ferebee court then explored
the alternative method of finding pre-emption, taking its cue
from the conflicting analysis in Silkwood, which required pre-
emption only when it was "physically impossible" to comply
with potentially conflicting law. The court held that FIFRA
created no such physical impossibility.58
Nevertheless, courts have found private tort claims pre-
461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972) (purpose of FIFRA is to keep unsafe products off the
market); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0301 (McKinney 1984) (purpose is "to regu-
late the registration, commercial use, purchase and customer application of pesti-
cides."); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Union Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). See also Jones, Index no. 18111/84, Trial Transcript
at 35-40 (Murphy, J. ruling from the bench) (appeal pending App. Div. 2d Dep't).
54. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
55. Id. at 248.
56. Id.
57. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
58. Id. at 1540-41.
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empted by pervasive regulatory law, and defendants continue
to press the defense.59 This result is rendered paradoxical be-
cause Congress has consistently indicated that private rights
and remedies are appropriately adjudicated in courts of com-
mon law, and only rarely have legislative bodies imposed pro-
cedural or other limitations on recovery.60 Three examples in-
clude: (1) the Price-Anderson Act, capping potential tort
liability of persons employing the products of nuclear fission
under a government licensing scheme; (2) state statutes limit-
ing the nature of relief available from certain kinds of defend-
ants, usually motivated by sovereign immunity concerns or
other public policy notions; and (3) statutes of limitation, bar-
ring claims not asserted within a specified period following a
triggering event."
There are also circumstances where legislatures have
completely or partially substituted administrative or statutory
schemes for common law recovery, and have either barred or
limited recovery to a specified threshold or delineated types of
damage. Examples of substitution schemes include worker's
compensation, no-fault automobile accident liability statutes,
the federal black lung disease compensation program, and the
natural resource damages scheme developed under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).6 2  After considering proposals to in-
clude personal injury and property damage in CERCLA,
Congress declined to do so, and instead merely included a
provision that allowed states to recover for natural resources
damages within their territories.63 Thus, the prevailing view is
that federal environmental statutes, including FIFRA, do not,
and were not intended to circumscribe private rights at com-
mon law.
The irony, however, is that because there are diverging
views, some plaintiffs have had their private rights extin-
59. Id. at 1542.
60. See supra notes 51-52.
61. Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988). E.g., N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 214-a, 214-b, 214-c, 218 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993).
62. See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 113(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9613(g)(1) (1988).
63. See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 113(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9613(g)(1) (1988).
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guished precisely because Congress has seen fit to legislate in
the public interest. In this author's view, the tendency to find
a pre-emptive import in certain statutes is due in part to the
fact that these statutes were backward-looking, enacted after
the extent of damage was known, and with the express pur-
pose of rectifying known harms. In this context, a court might
be more inclined to regard legislative silence on the issue of
private rights together with the pervasive nature of the stat-
ute or regulation as indicating an intent to pre-empt. Had a
regulatory system been in place at the outset, where harms,
risks, and damage had not yet been documented and catego-
rized, the arguments in support of federal pre-emption would
have been much weaker. Moreover, because the defense is
perceived as viable, costs and litigation risks mount, discour-
aging as a practical matter, a full and fair hearing on the mer-
its of claims.
b. Foreseeability and Reasonableness: Standards of Care
The basic tort elements of reasonableness and foresee-
ability have proven to be the thorniest issues facing the courts
and litigants in tort actions arising from organic chemicals.64
This is mainly because of the unforeseeability that was later
demonstrated to be inherent in organic chemical technology.
It can be argued: who could have reasonably foreseen a
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Negligence is con-
duct "which falls below the standard established for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm." A determination of whether conduct is "reasonable"
involves an inquiry in which the trier of fact examines: (a) the probability that an
injury will occur (foreseeability); (b) the gravity of the injury; and (c) the cost of
avoiding the injury. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., applying New York law). "What degree of care is reasonable
necessarily depends upon the peculiar attendant circumstances of the particular case.
Negligence arises from breach of duty and is relative to time, place and circum-
stance. Ordinary care must be in proportion to the danger to be avoided from the
neglect." Rotz v. City of New York, 143 A.D.2d 301, 304-05, 532 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1988). One is wanton and reckless when one acts with
knowledge of probable consequences and with reckless disregard for the conse-
quences. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2), comment b (1977). An unjustifi-
able non-consensual invasion of property is a trespass. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307
N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 (1954) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 158,
comment h (1934)).
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product's ability to cause specific environmental or physiologi-
cal harms when its manufacturer did not even know all the
ingredients that were in it, the properties of the ingredients or
their relative proportions? 65 How can the reasonableness of
exposure of the food chain, the environment, the populace, or
an individual be proven, assessed, or adjudicated, when prod-
ucts (e.g. pesticides) were on the market or wastes were re-
leased into ,the environment decades before it was possible to
accurately measure their residues?"6 The foreseeability prob-
lem is compounded by the tendency of many organic chemi-
cals to metabolize in plant and animal tissue and to change in
the environment, sometimes to become even more toxic me-
tabolites or by-products.17
In the face of these dilemmas, many courts have shied
away from true strict liability, and some have incorporated
the elements of reasonableness and foreseeability into strict
products liability and ultra hazardous activities claims.68
Other courts have held industrial defendants to the standard
of an 'expert in the field' who presumably knew or should
have known the harms which could flow from the use, misuse
or disposal of their products.6 9 This fails to solve the basic
judicial dilemma, however, which occurs because the industry
has historically proceeded without any regulation and the
bulk of health and ecosystem impact studies were conducted
after the extent of environmental and human exposure was
documented by the government and third parties.70
Thus, more often than not, industry standards evolved
prior to, and independent of, regulatory standards. Therefore,
65. See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55,
65 n.l, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 n.1 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 and Comment K (1965)); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
647 F. Supp. 303, 318 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188
(6th Cir. 1988); Herman v. Welland Chem., Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 823 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
69. E.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). But see Michalko v.
Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179 (N.J. 1982) (knowledge of the defect is
imputed to the defendant as a matter of law).
70. See supra part II.C.
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reasonableness tests, incorporating the foreseeability element,
are ill-suited to defining liability in the now highly-regulated
field of organic chemical technology. Absent express legisla-
tive directives, courts are reluctant to predicate liability on af-
ter-discovered test data or after-promulgated rules. Courts re-
main reluctant even when plaintiffs strenuously argue that
certain defendants, as experts in the field, should have known,
or should have made a point of learning about or insuring
against certain generically, if not specifically, foreseeable
events. Similar to pre-emption, where some private litigants
have been deprived of their private causes of action precisely
because Congress legislated in the public interest, some pri-
vate litigants have been unable to prove the unreasonableness
of conduct precisely because a regulatory body saw fit to pass
a rule, after-the-fact, in response to the very problem of which
the litigant is complaining.7'
Had the legislative body seen fit to act in step with the
newly developing industry in the 1940s, before the problems
accrued, and had it seen fit to articulate the rights of private
litigants, courts today would not be trying to accomplish the
unenviable task of applying the tort elements of foreseeability
and reasonableness to a technology we now know was fraught
with unknowns and risks from the start.
Finally, had Congress simply articulated to what extent
statutorily mandated conduct should define, alter, or be evi-
dence of reasonableness or due care, the courts, which apply
the negligence per se rule only in carefully delineated circum-
stances, would not be forced to make the social value deci-
sions which are necessary for this determination. 2
71. See supra note 53; see also supra note 16.
72. See Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., Index no. 18111/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau County, Sept. 5, 1991) (Murphy, J. ruling from the bench that the cause of
action sounding in negligence per se was dismissed); Jones v. Arrow Exterminating
Co., No. 92-02133, Record on Appeal at 234-48 (pending N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't);
accord, Walsh v. Portuese, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991, Burke, J. ruling from the bench).
Compare Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 814, 818 (1920); Beauchamp
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 400, 190 N.E.2d 412, 240 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1963); Taylor v. Botnick Motor Corp., 146 A.D.2d 81, 84, 539 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (3d
Dep't 1989); Dance v. Town of Southampton, 95 A.D.2d 442, 445, 467 N.Y.S.2d 203,
206 (2d Dep't 1983); Cordero v. City of New York, 112 A.D.2d 914, 916, 492 N.Y.S.2d
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2. Damages
As with any claimed injury, plaintiffs in toxic tort litiga-
tion arising from the impacts of organic chemical technology
must ascertain: (a) which harms are actionable, (b) what
quantum of proof is necessary, and (c) what evidence will be
admitted. This section will focus on the judicial response to
the issues posed in (a) and (b). Admissibility of evidence is
considered in the following section. 3
Any similarity to "traditional" torts fades rapidly because
the common law limitations on recovery for increased risk of
disease, fear of disease, and medical monitoring for early dis-
ease detection have been crafted explicitly to avoid specula-
tion or fabrication in situations where no harm has yet been
manifested.7 4 Where the plaintiff can prove that he has al-
ready contracted cancer or another significant injury as a re-
sult of an incident or exposure, the perceivable need for such
precautions should not exist. Thus, the potential scenarios
may be identified as (a) those where a serious physical ailment
has already resulted and (b) those where it has not yet been
manifested.7 5
430, 432 (2d Dep't 1985).
73. See infra part II.D.3.
74. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1958); see also Trapp v. Metz, 28 N.Y.2d 913, 271 N.E.2d 166, 271 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1971) (cancerphobia); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477
N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984) (medical monitoring).
75. Strohm v. The N.Y., Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co., 96 N.Y. 305 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1984) (no actual injury alleged); Reingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
Docket No. 74-3420 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no actual injury alleged); Amendola v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (no physical injury alleged and
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) expressly precluded recovery for emotional
distress in the absence of physical injury); Pollack v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 686
F. Supp. 489 (D.N.J. 1988); Stites v. Sundletran, 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (no actual injury); Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd,
683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (Federal Tort Claims
Act - limited waiver of sovereign immunity, no actual injury); Deleski v. Raymark
Indus. Inc., 1986 WL 1965 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1987) (no
present manifestation of illness). In Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188
(6th Cir. 1988), multiple plaintiffs alleging injury from exposure to organo-chlorine
compounds presented claims for injury including headaches, enlarged liver, coughing,
nosebleeds, shortness of breath, skin rashes, nervous system disorders and one cancer.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Tennessee State law, expressly sus-
1993]
21
732 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
The claims of increased risk of illness and fear of in-
creased risk are separate and distinct and have been distin-
guished by courts addressing the issue. They are (1) a claim
for damage based upon an increased risk of cancer or other
disease per se; and (2) a claim for damages arising from the
reasonable fear occasioned by the increased risk of con-
tracting cancer or any one of a number of different diseases in
the future relating to a toxic exposure (and the fear that a
family member would contract such a disease) and medical
monitoring. Distinct criteria have been developed for each. In
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, the New Jersey Superior Court
adopted one of the earliest rules for recovering for increased
risk per se - that it be quantifiable.78
In Herber v. Johns-Manville,7 one of the earliest cases
articulating the so called "51% rule" for increased risk of can-
cer as an element of damage per se, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff could not recover for increased
risk of cancer unless the risk was more probable than not, (i.e.
greater than 51%). The Third Circuit also found, however,
that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to exclude
evidence of the plaintiff's increased risk of cancer, because
that evidence was "highly probative" on his claim for medical
monitoring even though the increased risk was less than 50%.
Thus, while proof that the likelihood of future disease ex-
ceeded 50% was not a necessary element of proof on the claim
for medical monitoring, it was necessary for recovery for the
tained all claims for fear of increased risk of cancer, medical monitoring and impair-
ment of life's quality, even for those plaintiffs who had only sustained transient ill-
ness, and remanded for modification on the questions of increased risk of cancer
where testimony had not satisfied Tennessee State law as to reasonable medical cer-
tainty. In Fusaro v. Porter-Hayden Co., 145 Misc. 2d 911, 548 N.Y.S.2d 856, 170
A.D.2d 239 (1st Dep't, 1989), Judge Freedman sustained plaintiff's right to bring a
second action for mesothelioma under the N.Y. 1986 Revival Statute where (a) he
had not sustained cancer previously, asbestosis being a separate disease and (b) there
was some evidence that mesothelioma was caused by exposure to different particles.
See also Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
76. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1983)
[hereinafter Ayers I], affd as modified, 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
1985) [hereinafter Ayers II], affd in part and rev'd in part, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
77. 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
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exposure and concomitant risk, per se. 8
In Herber, the court also found that there was nothing
unduly prejudicial about the evidence,79 and in any event that
the probative value of such evidence was so great that it could
not properly exclude it under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.8 0 In Sterling v. Velsicol,81 the court of appeals care-
fully separated the claims of increased risk and fear of in-
creased risk:
While there must be a reasonable connection between the
injured plaintiff's mental anguish and the prediction of a
future disease, the central focus of a court's inquiry in
such a case is not on the underlying odds that the future
disease will in fact materialize. To this extent, mental
anguish resulting from the chance that an existing injury
will lead to the materialization of a future disease may be
an element of recovery even though the underlying future
prospect for susceptibility to a future disease is not, in
and of itself, compensable inasmuch as it is not suffi-
ciently likely to occur.82
Thus, the claims for increased risk and fear of increased risk
are separate claims.
As applied in various states, including New York, plain-
tiffs are entitled to compensation for "cancerophobia," a form
of mental anguish, where there are indicia that the fear is gen-
uine and grounded in objective physical symptomatology or
scientific knowledge.8 3 Where persons are exposed to toxins
78. Id. at 83. See also Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133, Record
on Appeal at 251-84 (pending N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't); Walsh v. Portuese, Index
No. 13183/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, May 22, 1992, Judge John W. Burke
ruling from the bench), appeal filed, (App. Div. 2d Dep't June 12, 1992).
79. Herber, 785 F.2d at 83.
80. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 allows judges to exclude relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....
81. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
83. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21-2, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-53, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 1000 (1958); See also Trapp v. Metz, 28 N.Y.2d 913 (1971), rev'g 35 A.D.2d 851
(N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't 1970). Neither case applied a mathematical test of any sort
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which give rise to an increased risk of subsequent injury such
as cancer or other serious health effects, they may also be en-
titled to compensation for continued medical monitoring of
their physical condition . 4
Social policy is served by an award of the costs of medical
monitoring. As the New Jersey Superior Court noted in Ayers
I, such costs are a small price to pay for the public benefit of
early disease detection, lower costs and increased likelihood of
cure.
8 5
The 51% rule, now applied in some jurisdictions, bears a
striking resemblance to the preponderance of the evidence
rule required before a party can prevail in any civil litigation
proceeding. The analogy does not hold up, however, either as
a matter of science or social policy. There is no scientific ra-
tionale for a requirement of 51% increased risk as a prerequi-
site to recovery. The term bears no relationship to statistical
significance and confidence limits on the one hand, or the re-
ality of the harm itself on the other. The 51% threshold also
does not prove that, as a result of a certain defendant's acts, a
particular plaintiff's risk of an adverse biological outcome has
increased by some quantum. The figure may have relevance as
a measure of damages, but not as a preclusionary device. The
avoidance of fabrication should come from the existence of
objective scientific evidence - e.g., laboratory test data, air
samples, soil and surface samples, water samples, blood and
tissue samples, objective symptomology (even if minor), and
expert testimony - not from the arbitrary imposition of a
particular numerical cut-off.
This result illustrates, again, the dilemma of putting
courts in the position of having to make social policy judg-
ments in a complex scientific field pervaded by regulation
for recovery. Ferrara involved no risk assessment whatsoever. See also Ayers I, supra
note 76 and Ayers II, supra note 76.
84. See generally Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130 (N.Y. App.
Div., 4th Dep't 1984) (medical monitoring); See Ayers I, supra note 76, and Ayers H,
supra note 76; Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Amen-
dola v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988); see also supra
note 75.
85. Ayers 1, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
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without the benefit of the legislature's views on which harms
are compensable. When Congress purported to register certain
pesticides or provide for the abatement of leachate from land-
fills, did it really intend that persons whose bodies or commu-
nities were contaminated could only recover if their increased
risk of harm exceeds 51%? Because neither Congress nor state
legislatures have provided otherwise, courts have and may
continue to resort to the familiar comfort of the inapposite
"preponderance of the evidence" rule.
3. Evidentiary Rules
Two important evidentiary issues have emerged in toxic
tort actions arising from exposure to organic chemicals and
other substances. First, should courts or juries be the arbiters
of the credibility of the experts whose testimony is needed to
prove liability or causation? Second, are government records,
proceedings, documents, or actions admissible, and may ex-
perts rely upon them in formulating their opinions? That ei-
ther of these questions arises at all is testament to the com-
plexity of the scientific phenomena inherent in organic
chemical technology. That either of these questions arises
now, in the guise of "new" or "novel" scientific expertise or
governmental action, when the technology has been in place
and persons have been exposed for fifty years, is testament to
the backwardness of our regulatory approach and the judici-
ary's role in playing catch up.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a series of recent de-
cisions involving PCB's and asbestos, reviewed the attempts
of several lower courts to deal with proffered plaintiffs' ex-
perts on the question of causation. 6 Some trial and appellate
86. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992); Caterinicchio v. Pitts-
burgh Corning Corp., 605 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 1992) (a companion case to Landrigan);
Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991). See also Joseph F. Sulli-
van, In Trenton, Court Takes on Toxic Damage Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1991, at
B2L. See also Walsh v. Portuese, Index No. 13183/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County,
May 22, 1992, Judge John W. Burke ruling from the bench), appeal filed, (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep't June 12, 1992). Compare Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814
(1920); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal.
1989), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
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courts had barred the testimony of epidemiologists, statisti-
cians, and other non-medical scientific experts on the issue of
causation. These courts found that such evidence was simply
inadmissible.8 These courts and other courts that have
viewed this proposed testimony as "new," "novel," "inge-
nious," or "wacky" have demanded a rigorous pre-trial hear-
ing outside the view of a jury, at which the court determined
the admissibility of this proffered testimony.88 These eviden-
tiary hearings went well beyond the scope of any expert voir
dire, in which defendant's counsel is permitted to question
the expert in order to show his or her lack of qualifications.
Here, defendants were also permitted to amass and present
their own experts, whose testimony was not directed to the
merits of the case, but rather to the credentials and expertise
of plaintiff's experts.8 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the latter view, holding, ironically, that because of
the difficulties of proof in toxic torts, and the novelty of the
methods of proving causation, the traditional standards of ex-
pert scrutiny should be relaxed.90 The mere notion, that scien-
tific testimony emerging from the application of standard sci-
entific method to a fifty-year-old technology is novel defies
belief. Second, the notion that imposing expensive and tactic
revealing procedural hurdles on private litigants "eases their
burden" is divorced from reality. The financial obstacles
posed by the necessity of bringing experts in for additional
rounds of testimony severely prejudices plaintiffs with limited
resources. Moreover, giving defendants the opportunity, in ad-
dition to discovery, of creating a record for impeachment of
the expert at trial and for preparing cross examination in ad-
vance, will greatly heighten a plaintiff's litigation risk.
Ultimately, the question is whether there is any legiti-
mate reason to subject plaintiffs' experts in the field of or-
ganic chemical technology to a wholly different standard or
87. E.g., Rubanick, 593 A.2d 733.
88. See supra note 86.
89. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992); Caterinicchio v. Pitts-
burgh Corning Corp., 605 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 1992) (a companion case to Landrigan);
Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
90. Id.
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whether, as many federal judges have noted, the issue goes to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The fact that
courts are being forced to grapple with these issues in the
1990's and that the defendant's proposition that plaintiff's sci-
ence is "new", "novel", "junk", "wacky","' or "martian ' 92 is
given any credence whatsoever, illustrates the point that so-
cial policy making in this complex technological field should
not have been left to the judiciary. This is particularly true
when the technology has been in use for fifty years and gov-
ernment regulators have been dealing with these issues for at
least twenty. Rather, the very legislative bodies which, albeit
after the fact, sought to provide a public response to a public
pollution problem, should have taken the next step and given
more concrete guidance to the courts which would be called
upon to adjudicate private claims.
The second evidentiary issue which presently challenges
courts in the arena of organic chemical tort litigation flows
from the following question: Are regulatory standards or re-
quirements relevant and admissible on the issues of liability
or damages, and if they are, to what extent? Although there is
a general evidentiary presumption that governmental records
or proceedings are reliable, defendants in organic chemical
cases have pressed the point, with varying success, that gov-
ernment records, proceedings, findings, and rule-makings with
respect to organic chemical technology are untrustworthy, un-
substantiated, unreliable, irrelevant, inadmissible, and not the
proper basis of plaintiff's proffered expert opinions or
testimony.93
Again, there is a threshold question: Why should govern-
ment records in this context be viewed by courts differently
than in any other? In other words, why should this not go
91. Id.
92. See Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., Index no. 18111/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau County, Sept. 5, 1991).
93. See Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133, Record on Appeal at
79-80, 82-94, 95-99, 102-233, 285-316, 331-38, 339-60, 482-85, 644-45, 650-55, 898-906
(pending N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep't); Dine v. Western Exterminating Co., 1988 WL
28370, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1988); Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972
(S.D. Ohio 1992).
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simply to the weight of the evidence rather than to admissibil-
ity?94 This is particularly so where defendants are routinely
permitted to wrap themselves in the shroud of government
approval, even if it is outdated or based solely on evidence
proffered by the industry. This evidence proffered by industry
would never have withstood the scrutiny that defendants now
urge upon courts when reviewing plaintiffs' scientific
experts.9 5
The reason such arguments are not dismissed out of hand
is two-fold. First, the statutory and regulatory response to or-
ganic chemical technology was adopted after-the-fact as a re-
action to the enormity of documented pollution and exposure
problems.9 Courts are reluctant to ascribe relevance to after-
developed rules and regulations, for what they perceive are
fairness and foreseeability reasons. This logic has been ex-
tended to rules and regulations which post-date the industry,
even when they pre-date the activity or injury in a particular
case.9 7 Moreover, the regulatory response, precisely because it
was a response, is more readily characterized as political over-
reaction to a public problem and therefore is not relevant to
the private controversy before the court. If rules had been in
place at the outset of the technology, and if these rules had
been forward-looking enough to, (a) specify the rights and
scope of potential liability of private litigants, and (b) direct
that government rules and actions regarding the technology
are presumptively reliable and relevant in private lawsuits,
courts would not be faced with the necessity of making these
social policy judgments now, when faced with the complex sci-
entific issues that organic chemical technology brings before
94. Accord, Moore v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., No. H-80-415 (D. Conn. Oct. 20,
1985); Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
95. E.g., Jones, No. 92-02133, Record on Appeal at 396-404, 635-45. Compare
scrutiny required of plaintiffs experts in cases reviewed by the N.J. Supreme Court.
Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992); Caterinicchio v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 605 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 1992) (a companion case to Landrigan); Rubanick
v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991). For a discussion of these cases see
supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
96. See supra notes 16, 33.
97. See Jones, No. 92-02133, Record on Appeal at 283-316, 361-94, 482-85, 650-
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the bench.
III. Lessons to be Learned and Applied
The biotechnological era has arrived. Its terminology is
moving from the rarefied spaces of high tech labs to hospitals,
TV shows, and news rooms. It has invaded pop culture, from
JURASSIC PARK to "Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles".98 Its
products and processes, long used in agriculture and once
solely the stuff of science fiction, are now making their way
into areas of environmental management, practical medicine,
commercial food production, and even homes and busi-
nesses.99 Biotechnology issues impact the investment, insur-
ance, and regulatory decisions which are being made
everyday.100
Some see the advent of practical biotechnology as the so-
lution to hazardous waste dumps, oil spills, disease, burns,
world hunger, and clogged drains.10 1 Some foretell doom and
damnation (A Brave New World)102 while others foretell
loosed pathogens (Andromeda Strain and The Stand).103 Now
is the time to look at the science, its processes, and applica-
tions, and consider ab initio and in light of our organic chemi-
cal experience, the appropriate guidance the legislative bodies
should afford the regulators and the courts in the develop-
ment of an interrelated jurisprudence which embodies societal
values and concerns.
98. MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1990); "Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles", Comic Characters, Mirage Studios.
99. See supra notes 1, 12; see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 4 U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOL-
OGY, OTA-BA-360, chapters 9, 10, 11, app. A, B, C, D. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Print-
ing Office, July 1988).
100. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOP-
MENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 4 U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, OTA-BA-360, chap-
ter 5 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Printing Office, July 1988).
101. Id. See supra note 99.
102. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
103. MICHAEL CRICHTON, THE ANDROMEDA STRAIN (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1969);
STEPHEN KING, THE STAND (Compl. and Uncut ed. Doubleday 1990).
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A. Regulation to be Forward-Looking - Adopting the
"Seventh Generation" View of the Challenge
Regulation bears the responsibility of being precise
enough to protect the commonweal from undue risks and
hazards without squelching the development of valuable prod-
ucts and processes which have the potential for improving the
human condition and increasing revenue. In the case of or-
ganic chemical technology, the respective regulatory packages
were too late. As a result, they were costly, cumbersome, back-
ward-looking, and incomplete. They took investment dollars
which could have been used for economic stimulation and ap-
plied them to establishing and complying with regulatory sys-
tems (e.g. manifests) for industries in place and cleaning up
past messes with associated transaction costs (e.g. consultant's
and attorneys fees). Had a regulatory system grown with the
industry, from the 1940s until today, the result could have
been much different.
With biotechnology, the opportunity is ripe for the devel-
opment of a lean, efficient, and finely tuned regulatory ap-
proach, one which is flexible enough to accommodate diverse
processes and fluid enough to deal with inherent scientific
complexity. The industry is young enough to grow with regu-
lation and to anticipate regulatory costs in investment and in-
surance decisions. If the nation acts, it can maximize the pub-
lic and private return, provide incentives for beneficial
projects, and discourage troublesome ones. The "Seventh
Generation" might thank us for affording it the best. Con-
versely, if the nation fails to act, the "Seventh Generation"
may fault us, either for a mess of biological slime which needs
to be mopped up or, perhaps more tragically, for the lost op-
portunities caused by the public's hysterical refusal to permit
certain lines of research for fear of creating a doomsday result.
1. Overriding Ethical Considerations
To prevent knee-jerk reactions from driving legislative or
judicial outcomes, principled ethical considerations should un-
derlie all the issues surrounding the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy. The discussion of biotechnology regulation should involve
[Vol. 10
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multi-disciplined scientists, business and community policy
makers, lawyers, philosophers and ethical and medical special-
ists. It should embrace the technology as it is now known and
how it is predicted to develop.
Precisely because biotechnology, unlike organic chemical
technology, is highly charged with emotion, a method should
be established for articulating societal norms, consistent with
the U.S. Constitution, to increase the likelihood that danger-
ous processes are not promoted or ill-considered reactions to
aspects of the new technology do not foreclose beneficial re-
search and development. This short discussion is intended to
call attention to the need, not to establish the parameters.
Clearly, knee-jerk reactions, which can change with the stroke
of a political pen, are not conducive to the "Seventh Genera-
tion" view, either from the standpoint of the researcher, the
investor, or the potential beneficiaries of the process or prod-
uct. The Reagan-Bush Administrations' quasi-regulatory reac-
tion to fetal tissue research, which was reversed by the Clin-
ton Administration on its first day in office, is an example of
just how quickly passion can provoke a response in the field of
biotechnology.1 0 4
Congress, which in our political system is the proper po-
litical entity to deal with enacting laws on socially complex
matters, must articulate meaningful parameters and criteria
to govern biotechnological regulation. Congress should begin
the inquiry by ascertaining whether regulators should rely
upon the traditional risk-benefit analysis in determining the
acceptability of a process or product. In biotechnology, where
risk and unforeseeability are inherent in the technology, and,
because alteration of "natural" organisms or processes is con-
templated, it may be that a more basic inquiry into essential
judicial principles is necessary.105 The starting inquiry might
be whether the process/organism is inherently designed to
104. [Clinton] Executive Order, January 21, 1993; Kenneth L. Woodward et al.,
A Search for Limits, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1993, at 52-53; see also supra note 12; see
also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN Bio-
TECHNOLOGY, 2 BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY - SPECIAL
REPORT, OTA-BP-BA-45 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Printing Office, May 1987).
105. See supra notes 43-44, 49-51, 93, 95-97.
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better the environment or human kind or whether it has some
other design function or significant risk of perversion. If
clearly the former, e.g. improving the nutrient quality of a
food stuff or destroying accumulated hazardous waste, then
the traditional risk-benefit inquiry might suffice. If the answer
to the first question is unclear, the risk-benefit analysis may
need augmentation by resorting to more basic principles. If
the answer to the fundamental question is no, (e.g. the devel-
opment of de-foliating organisms or biological warfare agents),
the immediate solution may be to resort to more basic princi-
ples. Again, deciding what principles should apply and how
they should be articulated as a conceptual framework for bi-
otechnological advances, deserves the immediate attention of
lawmakers, with the advice of philosophers, scientists,
ethicists and lawyers.
Medical applications of biotechnology, while not new (all
vaccinations against infectious diseases are applied biotech-
nology) will continue to raise new and challenging ethical
questions. Medical applications raise at least a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the goal or design is the betterment of the
human condition. However, additional considerations arise
from the added potential for individual, rather than mere so-
cietal applications. Thus, superimposed upon the basic risk-
benefit paradigm are issues such as: appropriate notice and
disclosure to the patient, the confidentiality of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, the rights of the patient and his family, the
interests of the "silent" recipient or donor, (e.g. a fetus or in-
competent), and the interests of the society, state, or third
parties in the outcome or goal of a process or procedure. In
the development of protocols for life and death decisions
about extraordinary life support and resuscitation, and for
evaluation of patient suitability and disclosure, in procedures
ranging from sex changes to experimental fertility enhancing
treatments, a start has already been made. The basis for these
decisional processes might be explored as a springboard for
further ethical consideration of new or anticipated biotechno-
logical procedures in the medical field.
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2. Overriding Regulatory Considerations
In any regulatory scheme, Congress must determine who
will bear the burden of establishing the efficacy and safety of
processes and products, the quantum of proof that will suffice,
and who will evaluate test protocols and procedures. For bio-
technology, these basic parameters should be augmented by
an a priori determination of what degree of risk assessment or
demonstrable foreseeability should be required by regulation,
and how experimental technologies should, if at all, be distin-
guished from marketable ones.
The most obvious lesson learned from organic chemical
technology was that when the waste disposal industry is un-
regulated, significant contamination of large land masses and
water bodies results. Unregulated production processes, with
their associated air and water emissions, also damaged the na-
tion's air and water resources. Furthermore, due to the ab-
sence of a legislative directive, human health impacts were not
scrutinized until after widespread pollution and exposure had
already occurred. 10 6 Consequently, the most obvious area for
legislative consideration and action is, from the outset, to in-
sure that wide-scale pollution or contamination from bi-
otechnological processes and products simply does not occur.
Additionally, because of biotechnology's added level of scien-
tific complexity and the ability of living organisms to regener-
ate, recombine, and mutate, special attention should be given
to insure that living materials created by biotechnology are
simply. not allowed to escape into the environment.
Each of these goals could be accomplished either by shor-
ing up regulatory loopholes in existing statutes or by adopting
an entirely new, tightly tailored governmental strategy. At
present, the federal regulatory and quasi-regulatory approach
to biotechnological products and processes is segmented
among a host of agencies. For example, the National Institute
of Health has formed an advisory committee charged with re-
view and approval of funding for projects involving genetic
engineering. The Food and Drug Administration has authority
106. See supra notes 30, 31, 33.
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over genetically engineered pharmaceutical products. The
United States Department of Agriculture has authority to
permit environmental releases under the Federal Plant Pest
Act'0 7 and regulates animal biologics under the Virus-Serum-
Toxin Act. 08 EPA regulates and registers genetically altered
microbes having pesticidal functions under FIFRA and directs
the "new chemical" review program under TSCA.'0 9 Except to
the extent that discharges into land, air, or water are, or may
be, caught up under regulations enacted pursuant to EPA's
authority over discharges of pollutants"0  and medical
waste,"' hazardous air pollutants," 2 or the generation, trans-
port, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste,"'
there is no direct regulatory approach in place to deal with
off-spec, spent or other living product, or the ultimate dispo-
sal of process waste, which includes living material. 4
In light of our organic chemical experience, a new strat-
egy is necessary to replace this current patchwork approach.
107. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-150jj (1988).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
109. See generally THE BNA SPECIAL REPORT SERIES ON BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S.
BIOTECHNOLOGY: A LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ROADMAP, SPECIAL REPORT #2 (Au-
gust 1989); Edward Kowek, Towards Understanding the United States Biotechnol-
ogy Regulatory Framework, August 29, 1988, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS, at 7 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 256, 1988) [hereinafter PLI 1988]. A
White House coordinating committee with no regulatory authority was chartered in
1985 (Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee). Id. at 17, 18.
110. CWA §§ 112(12), 301(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1262(12), 1311(a) (1988).
111. CWA §§ 502(20), 301(f), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(20), 1311(f) (1988).
112. CAA § 112(a)(6), (b)(1)-(2), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(6), (b)(1)-(2), (c)
(source categories). The "initial list" of hazardous air pollutants contains no biologi-
cal products. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
113. See generally RCRA §§ 1002, 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6903(5) (1988).
(The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes,
which -because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious char-
acteristics may .... ). RCRA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1988) (criteria for iden-
tifying and listing hazardous waste include toxicity, persistence and degradability in
nature). The term "infectious" is not defined in the statute. The 1980 implementing
regulations did not contain a category for "infectious" waste. See supra note 22.
114. See also Patricia Shanks, General Environmental and Health and Safety
Laws in the Context of Biotechnology Operations, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: NEW DEVELOP-
MENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS, at 55 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trade-
marks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 256, 1988).
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Such an effort would provide incentives for a fresh and crea-
tive look at the issues. It would necessitate calling upon per-
sons with appropriate and necessary expertise, obviating ex-
tra-agency turf battles, and looking at the big picture. While
organic chemical regulation was necessarily limited in scope
because it was developed in a backward-looking way to deal
with existing environmental problems, in biotechnology the
harms do not exist yet and thus the regulatory approach could
be truly forward-looking. Trying to utilize old statutes to de-
velop a forward-looking regulatory approach would present se-
rious risks. Whole classes of activity could be ignored. Sani-
tary engineers or other staff already in place would be called
upon to deal with increasingly complex biological questions.
The old statutes would retain a fragmented system with juris-
diction split up among a number of federal agencies and pro-
vide no mechanism to simultaneously address other pressing
issues including judicial guidance and ethical concerns.
B. Individual Harms and a Private Right of Action
In light of our experience with organic chemicals, three
questions need to be addressed early in the biotechnology pro-
cess: (1) Should a private right of action be established in fed-
eral law for personal injury and property damage?; and if so,
(2) What constitutes actionable "harm"?, and (3) What rela-
tionship, if any, should the regulatory standards have to
proofs or defenses in actions for personal redress? Our organic
chemical history confirms that a right of action must be made
explicit in any biotechnology regulatory scheme.
The nation's response to the impacts of organic chemical
technology has not only failed to make any provision for re-
dress of private harms, it paradoxically, in some circum-
stances, has made it more difficult for private parties to be
"made whole." The solution to this problem is threefold.
First, as discussed above, regulation should begin early in the
process, so that it can be truly forward-looking and not per-
ceived by courts as an after-developed "fix" having no rele-
vance to appropriate standards of care. Second, statutory at-
tention to the concepts of risk and foreseeability is needed to
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insure that archaic tort concepts do not preclude private re-
covery for harms arising from a technology whose proponents
are well aware of its potential lack of foreseeability, and its
inherent risks. Third, to avoid pre-emption of issues and end-
less wrangling in litigation in diverse courts, statutory provi-
sion for private redress should be made and Congress should
articulate the appropriate relationship between regulatory ap-
provals, prohibitions, and standards and the prima facie ele-
ments of tort liability.
Courts have been baffled by these organic chemical tech-
nology issues, which by comparison to biotechnology, is essen-
tially simple. Without guidance from the legislative bodies,
the complexities inherent in the biological processes of bio-
technology will make the current situation even worse. Fi-
nally, courts are ill-equipped to be the arbiters of social pol-
icy.11 5 This is the most persuasive reason for legislative action
in the biotechnology field, a field which is already highly
charged with passion and fraught with danger.
1. Guidance to Courts: Evidence, Experts and the Bur-
dens of Proof
For similar reasons, the need for legislative guidance to
courts extends also to questions of admissibility of evidence,
qualifications and scrutiny of experts, and burdens of proof.
Where defendants are still permitted to urge that experts in a
50-year old technology are propounding "new," "novel," or
"martian" science, " 6 it is hard to imagine the adjectives which
will be offered to discredit scientists in a technology which, at
least in terms of commercial or other practical applications,
truly is new and novel. Congress should consider, and then
articulate, standards for use of government records and pro-
ceedings in judicial proceedings, recognizing the expertise of
practitioners in the field, and shifting the burden of proof to
those who have peculiar or proprietary knowledge of processes
or products. Articulating these standards early in the develop-
115. See supra part II.D.
116. See supra notes 90-92.
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ing technology will avoid wasteful litigation and help to en-
sure fundamental fairness by providing early and timely no-
tice to investors, practitioners, market participants and
insurers of the risks associated with biotechnology.
2. Articulating Definitions of Risk and Foreseeability
Appropriate for the New Technology
The tort elements of foreseeability, reasonableness and
harm should be legislatively re-examined now. Congress or
state legislators should determine whether the traditional
common laws should be statutorily altered before courts are
called upon to fashion remedies in individual cases, and
before legislative bodies begin to enact extensive packages of
statutory/regulatory law. Otherwise, the nascent industry will
proceed at the risk of abrupt regulatory changes and financial
peril and, as seen when dealing with organic chemicals, the
community at large will proceed without the practical protec-
tions the common law is thought to provide. At a minimum, it
would be appropriate on some principled basis, in this techno-
logical area, to expand the legal concept of foreseeability to
include a larger, more generically described universe of pos-
sibilities. This would recognize the complexities and difficul-
ties of specific end point predictions which appear to be inher-
ent in the developing science. At the same time, such a
legislative action early in the regulatory process would place
investors and market participants on notice that a wider range
of possible outcomes will be deemed "foreseeable" and would
allow investment decisions to be made with full notice of po-
tential liability. This in turn would, hopefully, prompt the
regulated community to undertake studies of efficacy and
safety early in the process and weed out potentially harmful
or polluting processes or products before the "sunk cost" pro-
hibits abandonment of the project. Such an approach would
maximize safe and worthwhile processes and products by re-
quiring hard, realistic investment-based scrutiny up front. In
short, such a legislative pronouncement would induce the
market to police itself. Similarly, risk or exposure itself may
be appropriately defined as an actionable damage or an en-
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forceable event. However, absent legislative direction, courts
will once again be forced to chart unexplored territory, with a
high likelihood of the same unfortunate results we have seen
in the area of organic chemicals. Once again investors, insur-
ers and practitioners of new technologies will be unable to re-
alistically assess their financial risks, and victims of accidents
or reckless conduct will be without the protections our com-
mon law is thought to afford.
IV. Conclusion
The lesson to be learned from our organic chemical expe-
rience and applied to biotechnology is essentially threefold.
First, regulation in the field of biotechnology should not wait
until a public health or environmental nightmare is detected.
It should begin now and grow with the industry, providing in-
centives for improvements in production, efficacy of products,
safety and waste disposal. This will avoid the unfortunate re-
sult that regulation of methods and products, which lagged
behind and post dated the documentation of harm, hazard or
carelessness, are not only held to be inadmissible, but, by vir-
tue of their subsequent enactment, create an inference that
whatever the industry saw fit to do earlier was an exercise of
due care.117
Second, regulation should focus on the big picture; all as-
pects of the technological process from cradle to grave, includ-
ing the potential impacts that it will have on individuals, the
general public and society at large. Regulation should not only
provide for recovery of natural resource damages, but for indi-
vidual damages as well. It is a basic premise of this article
that it was a mistake to develop a pervasive regulatory rubric
for organic chemical technology without making provision for
standards for adjudicating private rights and remedies. Not
only did the lack of regulation and standards put courts in the
anomalous position of laboring to develop social policy, it also
called upon them to adjudicate issues of after-discovered pol-
117. Compare Jones v. Arrow Exterminating Co., No. 92-02133, Record on Ap-
peal at 898-906, 524-31, 663-95, 700-19, 898-906, 448-54 (pending N.Y. App. Div., 2d
Dep't).
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lution and injury, applying the traditional tests of foreseeabil-
ity, reasonableness and harm. The courts' struggle with these
issues has been highlighted above.118 In addition to these basic
dilemmas, the regulatory system itself has directly caused
some ironic results, specifically in the areas of pre-emption,
standards of care and admissibility of evidence. It is a para-
dox that the very existence of regulations designed to protect
health and welfare have served, in some cases, to extinguish
private rights, limit the opportunities to prove deviation from
reasonable care, and made more onerous the tests for admissi-
bility of evidence.
Third, the role and responsibilities of the regulator and
the regulated entity should be grounded in an evaluation of
whether a proposed use or process conforms to an articulated
acceptable social norm or value. We as a society are poised on
the brink of the era of applied biotechnology and we stand to
reap the benefits and incur the risks that this technology will
bring in the coming years. Using the history of organic tech-
nology as a guide, we have the opportunity to investigate the
legal, regulatory, and ethical considerations which should gov-
ern biotechnology, which is scientifically complex, rich in po-
tential, but fraught with risks. By establishing statutory and
regulatory decisions now, we can avoid the legacy of debt rid-
den waste sites and complex tort litigation that organic chem-
ical technology has left us. At the same time, we can maximize
the likelihood that the "Seventh Generation" will enjoy the
positive fruits of the new biotechnology.
118. See supra part IID.
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